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Gubernatorial Discretion Not Advised
THE CASE FOR SPECIAL ELECTIONS TO FILL
SENATE VACANCIES
With the United States at war with itself and its very
existence teetering on the brink of collapse, commander-in-chief
Abraham Lincoln stood before a group of soldiers at a military
cemetery in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and declared that
“government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not
perish from the earth.”1 Inherent in this democratic ideal was the
principle that “the people should choose whom they please to
govern them. . . . [P]opular election, should be perfectly pure, and
the most unbounded liberty allowed.”2 Today, this liberty is often
taken for granted. We flex our democratic muscles in voting for
everything from our Presidents, congressmen, and governors, to
our corporate directors, local school boards, reality show winners,
and top plays of the day in the world of sports. Yet the ability to
choose our leaders, a staple of our democratic society and
republican government, has only received the benefit of
constitutional protection for a relatively short span of time. The
Fifteenth Amendment, which precluded states from denying the
right to vote on the basis of race, was not made a part of our
Constitution until 1870.3 Women would have to wait another fifty
years for the Nineteenth Amendment to guarantee that the
government could not restrict the right to vote on the basis of
sex.4 The democratic impediment of a poll tax was not removed
from the voting booths until passage of the Twenty-Fourth
Amendment in 1964.5 And it wasn’t until 1971, with ratification
of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, that young men and women old
enough to go to war were permitted to choose their
representatives responsible for sending them there.6 It has taken
1

President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 795 (1995) (quoting
Alexander Hamilton).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
4
Id. amend. XIX.
5
Id. amend. XXIV.
6
Id. amend. XXVI.
2
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Congress and the States the better part of the past two hundred
years to recognize, as the Supreme Court has, that suffrage is a
fundamental right, and a crucial linchpin of our democracy.
The right to elect our representatives in the Senate was
not established until 1913, with ratification of the Seventeenth
Amendment. Prior to 1913, senators were constitutionally
required to be appointed by the legislatures of their respective
states.7 Beginning in the early nineteenth century, a movement
was underway, comprised of reformers who believed that “the
direct vote was the inalienable right of every citizen,” to remove
the choice of senator from the discretion of the state
lawmakers.8 What emerged from this nearly century-long effort
was an amendment with a crystal clear democratic purpose to
put into the hands of the people the right to choose their
leaders.9 However, in the years since ratification, an inherent
flaw has come to light that has served to undermine the
original purpose of the amendment.
Immediately after vesting in the people the right to elect
their senators, the drafters of the Seventeenth Amendment set
forth the procedures by which vacancies should be filled. This
section of the amendment reads:
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the
Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of
election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any
State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary
appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the
legislature may direct.10

In one swift action, the drafters took the power of
appointment, originally granted to the state legislatures, and
conveyed it to the state executives in instances where a Senate
seat becomes vacant.11 However, the amendment does not grant
appointment powers to the governors directly. Rather, it is in
the discretion of each state legislature to decide whether to
grant appointment power to the governor, or to require the

7

Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
C.H. HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY 50 (Transaction
Publishers 1995).
9
Laura E. Little, An Excursion into the Uncharted Waters of the Seventeenth
Amendment, 64 TEMP. L. REV. 629, 637 (1991).
10
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
11
See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Are Statutes Constraining Gubernatorial
Power to Make Temporary Appointments to the United States Senate Constitutional
Under the Seventeenth Amendment?, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 727, 729-30 (2008).
8
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governor instead to order that special elections take place.12
Thus, while the Seventeenth Amendment produced a uniform
method for the election of senators throughout the country, it
also created an inconsistent framework for their replacement
upon early departures from Capitol Hill. In turn, the vacancy
mechanism of the Seventeenth Amendment has produced a
slate of chaotic and often antidemocratic results.
Part I of this note documents recent events that have
brought this previously obscure issue into the national
spotlight. Part II provides a historical background of the
Seventeenth Amendment, detailing the movement that led to
its ratification and the three central concerns motivating its
supporters. Part III focuses on the evils confronted by the
framers of the Seventeenth Amendment and uses current
examples to show that these same issues remain prevalent
today. Finally, Part IV details the need for a constitutional
amendment to remedy the current flaws in our democracy. This
note ultimately concludes that in order to resolve the current
democratic crisis surrounding gubernatorial appointments,
special elections must be constitutionally mandated whenever
a vacancy in the U.S. Senate arises.
I.

THE CURRENT DEMOCRATIC CRISIS

In recent years, a string of infamous events have
occurred that have undermined the modern democratic
principles established by the Seventeenth Amendment.
Antidemocratic forces in our national politics have wrested
away the people’s right to choose their leaders and have
subsequently eroded the public’s trust in its own government.
One must look no further than to recent events in
Massachusetts, where the death of Senator Edward M.
Kennedy reignited age-old debates that surrounded the
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment. After Senator
Kennedy’s death on August 25, 2009, arguments ensued over
how to fill his vacant Massachusetts Senate seat.13 Existing law
in the state prescribed that:
[T]he governor shall immediately cause precepts to be issued to the
aldermen in every city and the selectmen in every town in the
district, directing them to call an election on the day appointed . . . .
12

See, e.g., id.
Kennedy’s Seat May Remain Empty for Months, CNN.COM (Aug. 26, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/08/26/kennedy.replacement/index.html.
13
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[which] shall not be more than 160 nor less than 145 days after the
date that a vacancy is created . . . .14

State law therefore mandated that the seat remain empty
until a replacement could be chosen by the people in a special
election that was to be held no sooner than 145 days after August
25, the date of the Senator’s death. However, the timing of the
vacancy and the national political climate served to transform
the issue into a partisan tug-of-war. The loss of Senator Kennedy
dropped Democratic representation in the Senate from sixty to
fifty-nine, thereby denying Democrats the ability to block a
Republican filibuster.15 Furthermore, the vacancy arrived at a
time when the debate over national health care reform had
reached a crescendo, with television screens rolling footage of
town hall protestors spewing angry barbs at elected officials.16 In
a posthumous letter addressed to both Massachusetts Governor
Deval Patrick and the state legislature, Senator Kennedy made a
public request to have his successor appointed by the governor.17
With critical legislation hanging in the balance and their
supermajority in the Senate in jeopardy, President Obama’s
administration exerted its own pressure on the state legislature
to change its procedures to allow Governor Patrick to fill the
empty seat before a special election could be held.18
This put Massachusetts Democrats in the awkward
position of amending a law that they were responsible for having
created just five years earlier. While Massachusetts Senator
John Kerry was campaigning for the Presidency in 2004, state
Democrats feared Republican Governor Mitt Romney would
appoint a member of his own party to succeed the candidate.19 To
prevent this scenario from taking place, the Democrats amended
the statute to require that special elections be held whenever
Senate vacancies arise.20 Any notion that this change was
motivated by democratic ideals in the spirit of the Seventeenth
14

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 54, § 140 (2004).
Glen Johnson, Kennedy Loyalist Tapped as Senate Replacement, HUFFINGTON
POST (Sept. 24, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/wires/2009/09/24/mass-governor-setto-name_ws_297986.html.
16
Philip Rucker & Dan Eggen, Protests at Democrats’ Health-Care Events Spark
Political Tug of War, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/05/AR2009080502780.html.
17
James Oliphant, Kennedy Asks Massachusetts to Change Successor Rules,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2009.
18
Johnson, supra note 15.
19
Michael Falcone, Massachusetts Democrats Wary of Kennedy Law Change,
POLITICO.COM (Sep. 12, 2009), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0909/27066.html.
20
Id.
15
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Amendment was refuted in 2009, when the Democrats once
again changed the law to allow for temporary gubernatorial
appointments, thereby clearing the way for Governor Patrick to
name Democrat Paul Kirk Jr. as Kennedy’s successor.21
Less than a year earlier, Illinois’s vacancy procedures
were the focus of national attention as a replacement was
sought to fill the seat left by Barack Obama’s ascendency to the
White House. According to state law, the seat was to be filled
by “the Governor [who] shall make [a] temporary appointment
to fill such vacancy until the next election of representatives in
Congress, at which time such vacancy shall be filled by
election . . . .”22 Thus, the ability to choose the people’s
representative was left exclusively to the discretion of Governor
Rod Blagojevich.23 As part of a wide-ranging investigation into
allegations of corruption against the governor, federal wiretaps
revealed Blagojevich leveraging the seat to secure future
campaign
donations
and
postpolitical
employment
24
opportunities. Fearing that he would exercise his statutory
duty to appoint a senator, federal authorities ended the sting
and arrested the governor before the country could find out
what a seat in the Senate was actually worth.25 Incredibly,
amid federal indictment and public outcry, Blagojevich sent a
letter to the President of the Senate of the United States
certifying his selection of Roland Burris to fill the vacant seat.26
After the Illinois Supreme Court deemed the appointment
valid, Senate Democrats backed down from their initial threats
to blockade Burris and allowed him to be seated.27 Not
21

Johnson, supra note 15. On January 19, 2010, the people finally had their say.
To the nation’s shock, they elected Republican Scott Brown to fill what had been a
Democratic seat for the previous forty-seven years. Matt Viser & Andrea Estes, Big Win
for Brown, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 20, 2010), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/
articles/2010/01/20/republican_trounces_coakley_for_senate_imperils_obama_health_plan.
22
10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/25-8 (2009).
23
Brian Ross, FBI: Illinois Governor Sought to “Sell” Obama’s Seat, ABC
NEWS.COM (Dec. 9, 2008), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ConductUnbecoming/story?id=
6424985&page=1.
24
Michael Scherer, Governor Gone Wild: The Blagojevich Scandal, TIME.COM
(Dec. 11, 2008), http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1865781-1,00.html. Governor
Blagojevich was caught on tape stating “I’m just not giving it up for . . . nothing” and
lamenting the fact that President Obama’s allies were “not willing to give me anything
except appreciation.” Id.
25
Id.
26
Burris v. White, 901 N.E.2d 895, 896 (Ill. 2009).
27
Z. Byron Wolf, Jonathan Karl & Kate Barrett, U.S. Senate Will Seat
Roland Burris, ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 12, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id
=6631014&page=1.
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surprisingly, a poll released months after his term began
revealed Burris to have a pathetic 17% approval rating, the
lowest of any sitting U.S. Senator.28 While the scandal
surrounding his appointment must have been a substantial
factor in the apparent lack of faith on the part of his
constituents, the democratically flawed method by which he
was chosen could not be overlooked either.
The gubernatorial appointment of Senator Lisa
Murkowski of Alaska in 2002 provides another outrageous
example of the Seventeenth Amendment’s flawed vacancy
provision. Senator Frank Murkowski, having served as
Alaska’s senator for twenty-two years, resigned his post to
become the governor of the state.29 Murkowski, “to the disgust
of many Alaskans,” chose his own daughter to fill his seat in
the Senate.30 Underscoring the inherent faults with this
nepotistic selection, the newly appointed senator held
divergent views from her father on two major political issues:
abortion and tax reform.31 Gubernatorial appointments that
keep the seat within the same political party are justified by
some on grounds that they are consistent with the wishes of
the constituents and thereby replicate their will until they can
vote in the next election.32 In the case of the Murkowski family,
although father and daughter were members of the same party,
their political views were arguably too incongruous to construe
the selection as an adequate reflection of the will of the people.
Outrage over the appointment spilled over to the next election
in 2004, when a ballot initiative was put forth to require
special elections when a vacancy in the Senate occurs.33 After
the ballot initiative passed, it was interpreted by the Alaska
28

Senate Approval Ratings, POLITICO.COM (May 22, 2009), http://www.politico.
com/blogs/scorecard/0509/Senate_approval_ratings.html.
29
Katharine Q. Seelye, New Alaska Governor Gives Daughter His Seat in
Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2002, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/21/us/
new-alaska-governor-gives-daughter-his-seat-in-senate.html.
30
Sanford Levinson, Political Party and Senatorial Succession: A Response to
Vikram Amar on How Best to Interpret the Seventeenth Amendment, 35 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 713, 720 (2008) (quoting Blaine Harden, Senator Murkowski’s Big
Problem: Dad the Governor, WASH. POST, Aug. 10, 2004, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A52838-2004Aug9.html).
31
Seelye, supra note 29.
32
Amar, supra note 11, at 753-58 (discussing Arizona’s statute that requires
the governor to choose a member of the departed senator’s party to fill the Senate
vacancy until the next election).
33
Alaska Judge Orders 500,000 Ballots Reprinted, Redistributed for Nov. 2
Election, USATODAY.COM (Sep. 29, 2004), http://www.usatoday.com/news/politicselections/
state/alaska/2004-09-29-ballots_x.htm.
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Supreme Court to have “eliminat[ed] gubernatorial
appointments from the process of filling [S]enate vacancies.”34
In New York, the appointment made by Governor David
Patterson to fill the vacant Senate seat of Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton was likewise tarnished by “its share of
acrimony.”35 While there were no allegations of political
misplay, the process to find a successor took weeks and was
seen by critics as “a careful political calculation” by a governor
who was presumed to be running for re-election in 2010.36 Not
only did Governor Patterson’s selection offer New Yorkers the
unsavory scenario of having a loosely elected governor appoint
an unelected senator,37 but it also reflected the danger posed by
the mixture of state and national politics. When the two are
combined, government roles and accountability become
confused, leaving the people misrepresented on both levels of
government.38 This issue was a major impetus that led to
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment.39
Though unseemly gubernatorial appointments may have
damaging political repercussions for the parties involved,40 they
have, with the potential exception of Governor Blagojevich,41 not
34

State v. Trust the People, 113 P.3d 613, 614 (Alaska 2005). Interestingly,
Senator Lisa Murkowski won a surprise re-election bid as a write-in candidate in 2010.
William Yardley, Murkowski Wins Alaska Senate Race, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/us/politics/18alaska.html. Thus, it appears the voters’
anger had little to do with the choice of senator, but rather the method by which she was
chosen.
35
Emily Friedman, Feingold Seeks Change in Empty Senate Seat Protocol,
ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 27, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/story?id=6734789&page=1.
36
Javier C. Hernandez, Danny Hakim & Nicholas Confessore, Patterson Announces
Choice of Gillebrand for Senate Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2009/01/24/nyregion/24choice.html. Ultimately, Governor Patterson decided
not to seek a second term. Danny Hakim & Jeremy W. Peters, Under Fire, Patterson Ends
His Campaign for Governor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/02/27/nyregion/27paterson.html.
37
Governor Patterson was elected as New York’s Lieutenant Governor, and
ascended to the Governor’s mansion upon the downfall of Governor Elliot Spitzer, who
resigned amid scandal surrounding his involvement in a prostitution ring. Michael M.
Grynbaum, Spitzer Resigns, Citing Personal Failings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/12/nyregion/12cnd-resign.html.
38
Roger G. Brooks, Note, Garcia, the Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of
the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 189, 200 (1987).
39
See Virginia M. McInerney, Federalism and the Seventeenth Amendment, 7
J. CHRISTIAN JURISPRUDENCE 153, 169 (1988); see also Brooks, supra note 38, at 207.
40
See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text.
41
Blagojevich’s trial for attempting to sell President Obama’s Senate seat
ended in a mistrial, though federal prosecutors have announced their intention to retry
the former governor. Monica Davey & Susan Saulny, Blagojevich, Guilty on 1 of 24
Counts, Faces Retrial, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/08/18/us/18jury.html.
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run afoul of the law. In fact, the Supreme Court affirmed and
upheld one of the more egregious uses of the appointment power
against a Seventeenth Amendment challenge brought by voters
in the state of New York.42 With the legality of gubernatorial
appointments largely a settled issue, the door remains open for
the types of scandals and political chicanery which have been
commonplace in recent years. Therefore, a state like
Massachusetts can choose to have the governor appoint a
successor in years where the executive and legislative branch
are controlled by the same party, and subsequently amend the
law to require special elections in years where no such
alignment exists. Vacancies can continue to be filled according to
political loyalties and special interests rather than as an
accurate reflection of the will of the people. However, while these
practices may not be in violation of the law, they are at odds
with the goals and spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment,
discussed in the next Part of this note.
II.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE SEVENTEENTH
AMENDMENT

Although the Seventeenth Amendment was not enacted
until 1913, the campaign to remove the power of appointment
from the state legislature and open the Senate to direct
elections began nearly a century earlier. Reformers intended
the Seventeenth Amendment to tackle three main obstacles
that were threatening the legitimacy and efficacy of the
democratic system.
A.

Road to the Seventeenth Amendment

The campaign to make the Senate directly accountable
to the people spanned nearly an entire century, beginning with
an initial proposal in 1826 and continuing through the ultimate
ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913.43 The
proposed reform was first introduced into the public debate just
two years after the presidential election of 1824, the first of its
kind to utilize the popular vote.44 Yet it would take another
42

See Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 853 (W.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d,
393 U.S. 405 (1969); see infra notes 224-35 and accompanying text.
43
RALPH A. ROSSUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 183
(Lexington Books 2001); Little, supra note 9, at 636.
44
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 85.
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eighty-six years of debate and 187 resolutions in Congress to
produce an amendment that would extend direct elections to
senatorial contests.45 Throughout the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, there was a steady drumbeat of
democratic fervor sweeping the country, and the direct election
of senators would become the crowning achievement of the
broader movement for direct democracy. By 1912, the Senate
could no longer drag its feet against the momentum of the
people.
The shift towards direct democracy was already
underway in the mid-nineteenth century, when states removed
property qualifications from the right to suffrage, thereby
opening the vote to all white males above the age of twentyone.46 Later that century, in an effort to make their
governments more “responsive” to the people, some states
began to implement popular referendums and ballot initiatives
designed to ease the process by which their constitutions could
be amended.47 According to Senate historian George Haynes,
the expansion of suffrage, the widespread use of the
referendum, and the addition of elective offices formed a larger
movement to “democratize American government,” a movement
that would later spawn the Seventeenth Amendment.48
The end of the nineteenth century produced two events
that would serve as important triumphs for the direct democracy
movement and ultimately break the will of those senators
resistant to constitutional change. First was the advent of the
senatorial primary election system, introduced by Nebraska in
1875.49 However, these initial primaries proved to be little more
than recommendations, as the state legislatures were not legally
bound to honor the wishes of their constituents by appointing
the election winner.50 Thus, in 1904, the people of Oregon
invented the “Oregon System,” whereby candidates for state
45

ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 183. Measures for direct elections were far
better received in the House of Representatives, where its members had always been
elected directly by the people, than in the Senate, where resolutions rarely made their
way out of committee. See generally id. at 194-214; see also HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at
141 (“[I]n five out of six congresses, the resolution had been mostly smooth sailing
through the House. This was certainly not the case in the Senate, where the resolution
was routinely rejected without ever coming to the floor for a vote.”).
46
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 56.
47
See id. at 69; see also GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED
STATES, ITS HISTORY AND PRACTICE 1041 (Russell & Russell 1960) (1938).
48
HAYNES, supra note 47, at 1041.
49
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 88.
50
ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 192.
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legislature could be pressured to disclose in their campaign
platforms whether they would “abide by the results of the
general election . . . regardless of party affiliation . . . .”51 This
modified primary system added teeth to its predecessor and held
state legislators accountable for implementing the will of the
people. By 1912, the year the Seventeenth Amendment secured
passage in both houses of Congress, twelve states were adhering
to the “Oregon System” and its de facto direct election regime,
while thirty-three states were using other forms of a primary
election system.52 Having already “abdicated their federal
[appointment] responsibilities in favor of the popular expedient,”
the state legislatures put enormous pressure on Congress to
heed the public’s calls for democracy.53
In addition to delegating to the people their
constitutional duty of choosing senators, state legislatures were
also calling for a constitutional convention to consider an
amendment that would open up senatorial elections to the
popular vote.54 The Constitution requires Congress to organize a
convention for proposing amendments upon the application of
two-thirds of the states.55 By 1908, acting on the belief that the
Senate would not change its electoral procedures on its own,
twenty-eight states had joined a coordinated effort to call a
constitutional convention to force the Senate’s hand.56 The fear of
a constitutional convention, combined with “the fact that most
senators represented states whose legislatures were on record as
favoring direct election” proved to be more pressure than the
Senate could bear.57 On June 12, 1911, after an eighty-six-year
battle, the Senate finally relented, passing the amendment by a
sixty-four to fourteen vote.58 Passage in the House followed
shortly thereafter.59 Finally, on April 8, 1913, the Seventeenth
Amendment was ratified by the states, becoming the secondquickest amendment to attain ratification.60

51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60

Id.
Id.
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 109.
ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 192.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 193-94.
Id. at 194.
Id. at 211-12.
Id. at 213-14.
Id. at 214.

2011]

B.

GUBERNATORIAL DISCRETION NOT ADVISED

1211

Aims of the Seventeenth Amendment

While the success in bringing about direct elections was
aided by a larger movement intent on spreading democracy to
the people, progressive reformers made their pitch for
constitutional change by taking aim at the inherent defects
plaguing the existing appointment system. Specifically,
reformers pointed to (1) corruption permeating the appointment
process; (2) the negative influence of the “political machines”; and
(3) the power of special interests as support for their argument
that removal of the appointment power from the state
legislatures was necessary.61 A review of these defects
underscores the spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment and
provides a crucial context in which to assess the current proposal
to remove the appointment power from state executives.62
1. Ending Corruption and Bribery
In rallying the public behind an amendment for direct
senatorial elections, perhaps no issue had as dramatic an impact
as the tales of corruption and bribery taking place in the state
legislative halls throughout the country. There is little question
that some of these sinister storylines were overexaggerated by
the “yellow journalists” of the era.63 The pure statistics reveal
that corruption was far from being as endemic or widespread as
reformers would have liked the public to believe. In the years
between 1789 and 1909, there were 1180 senators sent to
Capitol Hill by the state legislatures. Out of this pool, only
fifteen faced allegations of corruption, and only seven were
precluded from serving out their terms.64 Only one of the fifteen
alleged incidents of corruption took place prior to 1866.65 Thus,
the remaining fourteen charges were levied, not coincidentally,
at the same time that the movement towards democratizing
elections began to gain traction and find its voice.66 Nevertheless,
61

See, e.g., McInerney, supra note 39, at 168-69; see also Amar, supra note
11, at 744-45; Brooks, supra note 38, at 200.
62
See infra Part III.
63
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 97-98. “Yellow journalism” is a term used to
describe newspapers that used “lurid features and sensationalized news . . . to attract
readers and increase circulation.” Yellow Journalism, ENCYCLOPEDIABRITTANICA.COM,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/652632/yellow-journalism (last visited Feb.
1, 2011).
64
ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 191.
65
Id. at 190.
66
See id.
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perception trumped reality as these stories became “much
publicized and . . . crucial [to] undermining support for the
original mode of electing senators.”67
A review of some of the more sensational headline
stories illustrates the nexus between the corruption scandals of
the era and the fight for direct elections that was
simultaneously being waged in Congress. The first infamous
bribery case occurred in 1899 with the election of Senator
William Clark from Montana. Having failed in his bid to attain
office in 1890, a determined Clark devoted his impressive
resources to mount a successful campaign in 1899.68 On
December 4, 1899, the same day that Clark was to be admitted
to the Senate, a petition was filed by members of the Montana
legislature challenging the “validity of the pretended election”
on grounds of bribery.69 The complaint alleged that Clark
appropriated $35,000 for the votes of four state lawmakers,
with another $175,000 being offered to others for their “votes or
influence.”70 On May 15, 1900, with overwhelming evidence of
both Clark’s guilt and “corruption [which] totally pervaded
Montana politics,” the Senate voted to strip him of his seat.71
Just four days after being ousted, Montana’s acting governor
selected none other than embattled ex-Senator William Clark
to fill the vacant Senate seat.72 Though this action was reversed
three days later by the absentee governor, Clark was later
appointed to the Senate in 1901 by a state legislature
comprised of many of the same lawmakers who had received
financial support from Clark in the past. This time, he was
allowed to retain his seat in the Senate.73
A decade later in 1910, Senator William Lorimer of
Illinois faced “the most sensationalized, politicized, and
humiliating investigation in the history of the Senate up to
that time . . . .”74 The Illinois senator, already one year into his
term, found himself the subject of a Chicago Tribune article
containing admissions from state lawmakers that they had
67

Id. at 191.
The Election Case of William A. Clark of Montana (1900), U.S. SENATE, http://
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/contested_elections/089William_Clark.htm
[hereinafter Election of Clark] (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
69
Charges in the Clark Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1899.
70
Id.
71
Election of Clark, supra note 68.
72
Id.
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Id.
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HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 92.
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been bribed with cash and portions of a “jackpot” slush fund to
appoint Lorimer to the Senate.75 Lorimer was cleared of any
wrongdoing by the Senate based on inconsistent testimony
among the parties involved and a lack of adequate proof
necessary to unseat him.76 However, it was the rhetoric of
dissenting Senator Beveridge of Indiana, a member of
Lorimer’s own party, which placed the scandal squarely in the
middle of the ongoing Seventeenth Amendment debate.
Beveridge blasted the appointment system, stating, “The
candidate is not on trial. The election is on trial,” and just one
instance of bribery “makes the whole election foul.”77 By linking
the corruption scandal with an outmoded method of electing
senators, progressive reformers came to view the case against
Lorimer “as a holy crusade.”78
Adding fuel to the fire, on the eve of the Senate’s
decision on whether to unseat Lorimer, charges were filed
against Senator Isaac Stephenson of Wisconsin, alleging that
his seat had been obtained through corruption.79 Stephenson
was accused of violating primary campaign finance laws,
making illegal contributions, and offering bribes to assist in the
procurement of his appointment.80 Like Lorimer, Stephenson
was exonerated by a majority of senators who believed that
violations of state primary election laws should not preclude a
senator from being seated, since the primary system was not a
part of the constitutional process by which one becomes a
senator.81 The dissenting senators felt that although state
legislatures were not legally bound to appoint the winner of a
primary election, the primary vote did reflect the will of the
people, and therefore, any corruption in the primary process
would taint the appointment.82
75

See Tells of Bribes to Elect Lorimer, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1910; see also
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 94.
76
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 94; The Election Case of William Lorimer of
Illinois (1910; 1912), U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/
contested_elections/095William_Lorimer.htm [hereinafter Election of Lorimer] (last
visited Feb. 1, 2011).
77
Owen and Beveridge Say Put Lorimer Out, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1911.
78
Election of Lorimer, supra note 76.
79
Senator Stephenson Under Bribe Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1911.
80
Id.
81
The Election Case of Isaac Stephenson of Wisconsin (1912), U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/contested_elections/096Isaac_Ste
phenson.htm [hereinafter Case of Stephenson] (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
82
Id. Wisconsin was one of the states using a direct primary system that
allowed voters to express their choice for senator, thereby exerting political pressure on the
state legislators to honor their wishes. See id.; see also ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 192 n.49.
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Though Lorimer and Stephenson were both able to
retain their Senate seats, the debate surrounding their stories
served as a major impetus for the change in senatorial election
procedures. Both scandals took place as “public sentiment was
running high against the use of money and questionable
practices during state legislatures’ election of senators and
while
Congress
was
debating
the
Seventeenth
Amendment . . . .”83 The tales of scandal, the perception of
corruption, and the push for direct elections were inextricably
linked. Indeed, William Lorimer managed to escape expulsion
during the 61st Congress (which had rebuffed a direct elections
resolution).84 However, the 62nd Congress, boasting new
members who had used the scandal to gain political support in
the previous election cycle, retried the issue and ousted
Senator Lorimer, marking the only time in history a Senate
seat had been upheld by one Congress and repealed in the
next.85 Fair or not, the perception of abuse and corruption
“aroused suspicion that Senators elected by legislators . . .
could not be trusted to safeguard the public interest.”86 The
timing of the scandals alongside the ongoing debate over direct
elections meant one subject would rarely be discussed without
mention of the other.87 These headlines helped progressive
reformers rally the public and pressure Congress into passing
the Seventeenth Amendment.
Even where Senate seats were not directly paid for, some
appointments were nonetheless tainted by the appearance of
impropriety. Candidates fearful of arousing public suspicion
through direct bribes could still purchase a seat years in
advance by “contributing funds in every party contest, [and]
paying the campaign expenses of [state] legislators who would
respond to the call in senatorial elections.”88
For example, the nomination of William Sheehan for the
New York Senate seat in 1911 was properly condemned for this
brand of corruption. Sheehan had helped the Tammany
machine take control of the state legislature through his
campaign contributions and political endorsements, which

83
84
85
86
87
88

Case of Stephenson, supra note 81.
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 95.
See id. at 96.
HAYNES, supra note 47, at 1041.
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 92.
Id. at 99.
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carried great weight due to his personal celebrity.89 When the
machine returned the favor by nominating him for the Senate,
one legislator remarked that “Mr. Sheehan may not be exactly
the kind of man we believe should be sent to the United States
Senate, but he has done a lot for the party by turning control of
the Legislature over to us, and I believe he is entitled to his
reward.”90 These “rewards,” like the transparent corruption
present in the Lorimer and Stephenson escapades, motivated
the framers of the Seventeenth Amendment to put an end to
the “buying of seats” for good.91
2. Curbing the Power of the Political Machines
In the lead-up to the passage of the Seventeenth
Amendment, senators were increasingly viewed less as the
independent and deliberative choice of the state legislature, and
more as the selection of “party bosses who ruled the legislative
‘machines.’”92 There was a pervading “skepticism of government
officials . . . . It was the era of the professional politician, the
hey-day of the boss.”93 The parliamentary practices of the
“bosses” fueled the growing distrust of government officials and
gave rise to a number of concerns regarding the existing
electoral process.94 One primary concern, which rarely goes
unmentioned with any discussion of political machines, was
corruption, an issue that directly led to the ratification of the
Seventeenth Amendment.95 Two other issues that served to
embolden the movement for direct elections were closely linked
to the influence of the political machines: (1) the blending of
state and national politics, and (2) legislative deadlocks.
Prior to passage of the Seventeenth Amendment, party
leaders discovered that nominating a senator before a state
election, who would in turn campaign alongside the state
nominee, could help secure votes for their party.96 This widely
89

Id. at 100. The “Tammany machine” perpetuated political control over New
York City through a “blend of charity and patronage,” and became “synonymous with
urban political corruption.” Tammany Hall, ENCYCLOPEDIABRITTANICA.COM, http://www.
britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/582027/Tammany-Hall (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
90
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 100 (quoting a New York Times article).
91
HAYNES, supra note 47, at 1047.
92
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 17.
93
McInerney, supra note 39, at 166.
94
Amar, supra note 11, at 741.
95
See supra Part II.B.1.
96
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 86.
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used practice, known as “public canvass[ing],”97 was first
employed during the Lincoln-Douglas debates for Illinois’s
Senate seat in 1858. For the state legislators, their decision on
whether to endorse Lincoln or Douglas was to be “the biggest
popular issue in the upcoming state elections.”98 As the use of
canvassing increased throughout the country, many feared that
the mixture of state and national politics was “overwhelm[ing]
local issues” and “effecting the state’s legislative business.”99
Canvassing remained popular until 1913 because it
allowed a senatorial candidate to “drag a majority of the
legislators on his coattails,” thereby perpetuating the power of
the machines.100 However, as a consequence, state officials were
primarily being chosen for their choice of U.S. Senator, rather
than their local accomplishments and agenda.101 Voters in local
elections were “forced to consider both national and state
issues”102 at the polls, resulting in misrepresentation on both the
state and national levels.103 Summing up the growing frustrations
over machine influence, Senator Beveridge stated on the Senate
floor that “it [has] come[] to pass that Senators actually have
been . . . selected by the ‘party managers’ . . . . The party boss has
become more potent than the legislature, or even the people
themselves, in selecting United States Senators . . . .”104 Two
years later, direct elections would “put an end to the blurring of
issues in the election of members of the legislatures . . . .”105
Legislative deadlock was the other major issue attributed
to the political machines that served as an impetus for direct
elections.106 Often times, where one political party controlled the
state’s assembly and its rival party controlled the state senate,
the legislative apparatus of the state would come to a
97

See Brooks, supra note 38, at 207; see also Todd J. Zywicki, Senators and
Special Interests: A Public Choice Analysis of the Seventeenth Amendment, 73 OR. L.
REV. 1007, 1025 (1994).
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HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 87.
99
Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and Husk of History: The History of the
Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform Proposals, 45 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 165, 200-01 (1997).
100
HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 89.
101
McInerney, supra note 39, at 169.
102
Id.
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Brooks, supra note 38, at 200. See McInerney, supra note 39, at 169 (“The
people are electing [state] officials, not for their abilities, but for their choice of United
States Senator.”).
104
Little, supra note 9, at 641 (quoting Senator Beveridge).
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HAYNES, supra note 47, at 1070.
106
See Amar, supra note 11, at 741.
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standstill.107 Partisan bickering between legislative bodies would
sometimes leave the citizenry without any representation at all.
In fact, between 1885 and 1912, there were seventy-one
legislative deadlocks.108 Of these partisan battles, seventeen
resulted in a Senate seat remaining unfilled for an entire
legislative session.109 For example, in Delaware, the people were
left with only one senator in three different Congresses and with
none at all from 1901 through 1903.110 At other times, the
impasse in the state legislative halls led to outbreaks of
violence.111 As a result of these deadlocks, state legislatures were
rendered ineffective and Congress suffered from “the absence of
various state Senators.”112 Thus, legislative deadlocks helped
bolster support for direct senatorial elections.113
The candidacy of William Sheehan provides an
illustration of the corrosive effect that political machines had on
the levers of government in the years prior to the Seventeenth
Amendment.114 Sheehan had been nominated by Tammany boss
Charles Murphy as a reward for his efforts in helping a majority
of Democrats secure election to the state legislature.115 In turn,
the state Democrats, pressured by Tammany Hall, pledged to
cast their votes to send Sheehan to Capitol Hill.116 However,
“insurgents” from upstate that were not loyal to the Tammany
machine were ready to break rank and desert Sheehan’s
candidacy.117 When Republican lawmakers refused to choose
sides, a six-week deadlock ensued.118 The controversy was only
brought to an end after Tammany Democrats and the insurgents
compromised on a different candidate.119
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See ROSSUM, supra note 43, at 183.
Id. at 187.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
See HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 90. In 1896, Kentucky’s governor was forced
to declare martial law in order to quell public outrage over the Senate contest. Id. In
1905, Colorado’s Republican governor called in troops to confront Denver police who
supported the Democratic candidate for Senate. Id. And in Missouri in 1905, a fist fight
broke out on the floor of the assembly when tensions boiled over during a legislative
stalemate. See Zywicki, supra note 99, at 200.
112
McInerney, supra note 39, at 168-69.
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See, e.g., id.
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See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 100.
116
Dix, Worried, Hopes for Another Caucus, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1911.
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The Sheehan case demonstrates the litany of problems
associated with party-machine involvement in senatorial
appointments. First, his nomination was acknowledged as a
reward for “canvassing,” a practice that resulted in voters
electing state officials based on their choice of national political
figures rather than on their local records. Second, the rift
between Democrats loyal to the Tammany machine and the
“insurgents” produced a prolonged stalemate that brought the
state’s legislative process to a standstill. Third, the episode
could only be settled by compromise on a lesser known
candidate. Often, legislative deadlocks were broken only by
nominating “the darkest of the dark horse” candidates,
ultimately to the detriment of the people.120 Other times,
deadlocks led to states being completely unrepresented in the
Senate. Even when seats were eventually filled, the protracted
battles between the parties “always consumed a great deal of
state legislative time that was therefore not spent on other
important state matters . . . .”121 Thus, political-machine
influence and meddling proved to be another compelling issue
utilized by reformers to rally the nation behind direct elections.
3. Reducing the Influence of the Special Interests
Closely related to the suspicions surrounding political
machine control over the appointment of senators was the
alleged influence of big business. Large corporations contributed
substantial amounts of money to the political parties in each
state, with donations usually increasing during the years in
which a federal election was held.122 These funds would then be
used by the parties to finance their public canvass and massadvertising campaigns, and to help elect the state legislators who
had already pledged their vote for the party’s choice of senator.123
The Senate as a whole, with at least some members having been
put into power through the bankrolls of the corporations, became
labeled by progressive reformers as a “‘millionaire’s club,’
beholden to corporate and machine interests.”124
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Like the issue of corruption, however, the influence of
interest lobbying seems to have been overstated. Many
corporations donated money not to exercise control over
senatorial appointments, but merely to compete with their
business rivals who were simultaneously forking over large
amounts of money to the machines in an attempt to influence
local legislation.125 Their only real strategy, therefore, was to be
seen on the winning team when all was said and done. The
corporations implemented this strategy by hedging their bets
and donating to both parties when the election appeared too
close to call, or by simply withholding funds until a winner was
all but certain.126 In addition to the lack of real power and
control over the appointment process, Professor Todd Zywicki
points out that, contrary to the allegations of the reformers,
corporate influence over national lawmakers was actually at a
low point in the late-nineteenth century due to the high
transactional costs associated with forming a special interest
contract with the federal government.127 This theory runs
counter to the characterization of the Senate as a conglomerate
of individuals indebted and subservient to the corporate
interests that sent them to Capitol Hill.
Still, as was true of the corruption issue, perception
overwhelmed reality and special interest influence helped
progressive reformers realize their goal of direct elections.
There was no disputing that special interests were contributing
to state and local governments, a fact that surely could have
eroded the public’s confidence in the legislature’s ability to
appoint the most qualified candidate to represent the state in
the Senate. In addition, the lack of uniformity in senatorial
election procedures, along with a disparity in political stability
between regions, created Senate “Stalwarts” in the East, and a
constant changeover of senators in the West.128 The stark
contrast in seniority between the regions provided special
125

HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 104.
Id.
127
Zywicki, supra note 97, at 1038 (arguing that the Seventeenth Amendment
was passed at the behest of special interest groups). Before 1913, the transaction costs
of lobbying were “extremely high,” since interest groups were forced to persuade not
just Congress but also the state legislatures, who could remove a senator who did not
vote in the “desired manner.” Id. The fact that each house of Congress was accountable
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interests exercising influence over eastern senators, such as
the railroad industry, with the ability to procure federal
funding at a disproportionate level to the detriment of the
western agrarian interests.129 Thus, it was the western states
that most actively championed the direct election of senators in
order to even the special interest playing field.130 Ultimately,
regardless of whether the special interests truly possessed
substantial control over the appointment process and
subsequent policy decisions of the senators, passage of the
Seventeenth Amendment was hailed as a “hard-earned and
much-needed triumph of ‘the people’ over special interests.”131
However, the reformers’ victory was not as complete and
thorough as was once believed. As will be seen in Part III of
this note, corruption, political influence, and special-interest
control continue to plague the electoral process of the U.S.
Senate.
III.

CONCERNS SURROUNDING GUBERNATORIAL
APPOINTMENTS

Ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment extended
democracy to the people by allowing them to choose their
senators directly, rather than leaving the decision to the
discretion of state legislatures perceived as incapable of
handling the responsibility. Still, the framers of the
amendment left some vestiges of pure representative
government intact by granting the state executive the power to
make an appointment when a vacancy arises.132 Since
ratification in 1913, there have been 188 gubernatorial
appointments to fill vacant Senate seats.133 Over this time, “the
process of awarding the [Senate] office has become fraught

129

Id. at 205-06; cf. Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and
the Seventeenth and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971, 1977 (1994) (“In the
Midwest, agrarian interests became convinced that only popular election could weaken
the power that railroads and other corporate interests had over the Senate and end the
economic discrimination against the region.”).
130
Zywicki, supra note 99, at 205-06. Zywicki is careful to note that “western
politicians did not favor direct election purely because of an ideological commitment to
democracy and popular government. Rather, westerners favored popular election
primarily because they saw it as an instrument for increasing their influence in
Washington and to enact policies designed to further their economic interests.” Id. at 206.
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Zywicki, supra note 97, at 1010 (citation omitted).
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See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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Appointed Senators, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/briefing/senators_appointed.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2011).
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with malfeasance and political peril.”134 The same issues that
progressives exploited to remove appointment power from the
state legislatures—namely, corruption of the appointers,135
and
special
interest
political
party
manipulation,136
137
influence —are the same issues that have plagued
gubernatorial Senate appointments since ratification. As a
consequence, the credibility of both the governors and their
appointees has been undermined, while public trust in the
government has eroded. In keeping with the spirit of the
Seventeenth Amendment, if the response to these evils in 1913
was “more democracy,”138 then the power to choose our senators
must once again be removed from politicians and granted
directly to the people. This part examines the three primary
issues motivating the Seventeenth Amendment in our modern
day political context, and demonstrates that the current
gubernatorial appointment scheme suffers from the same fatal
flaws that sabotaged the pre-Seventeenth Amendment
electoral process.
A.

Gubernatorial Corruption

It is unknown whether the framers of the Seventeenth
Amendment believed that state executives were a more-trusted
source of authority than their colleagues in the legislative
branch, though this may be presumed based on the appointment
power having been taken from the legislators and granted to the
governors.139 Events in the past decade, however, reveal that any
ethical credit afforded to the state executives was likely
unwarranted and undeserved. For example, in 2003, Governor
Edwin Edwards of Louisiana was sentenced to ten years in
prison after being found guilty on charges of corruption.140 The
following year, Governor John Rowland of Connecticut was
forced to step down after pleading guilty to a federal conspiracy
134

Carl Hulse, Senate Vacancies Leave a String of Sordid Tales, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/11/us/politics/11senate.html.
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See supra Part II.B.1.
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See supra Part II.B.2.
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senators themselves, rather than state legislators who, like candidates for seats in the
House of Representatives, are subject to election in gerrymandered districts).
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Lauren Johnston, Ex-Governor Talks From Prison, CBSNEWS.COM (Oct.
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charge.141 In 2005, Governor Bob Taft of Ohio, great-grandson of
former President William Howard Taft, pled no contest to
misdemeanor ethics violations.142 In 2006, Governor Don
Siegelman of Alabama was convicted on bribery and corruption
charges,143 and Governor George Ryan of Illinois was sentenced
to prison for racketeering, fraud, and lying under oath.144 In
2008, Governor Rod Blagojevich of Illinois was ousted from office
after he allegedly attempted to sell then-President-elect Barack
Obama’s vacant Senate seat.145 Also in 2008, Governor Elliot
Spitzer of New York was forced to resign after being implicated
in a prostitution ring.146 Finally, in 2009, Governor Mark Sanford
of South Carolina disappeared to Argentina to carry on an
extramarital affair, allegedly using taxpayer money and
campaign donations to finance the excursion.147 Sanford faced
thirty-seven ethics violations that were ultimately settled,
thereby allowing him to escape impeachment.148 This rundown of
general gubernatorial corruption within the past decade is not
meant to characterize all state executives as inherently corrupt.
Rather, it illustrates that the office of the governor, like the
state legislative halls at the turn of the century, has been
tainted by a steady barrage of media reports detailing episodes
of corruption and ethics violations. It is through this prism that
gubernatorial appointments to fill vacant Senate seats are now
being viewed by the public.
Since ratification, Senate vacancy appointments have
rarely involved the type of transparent bribery made infamous
in the cases of William Clark149 and William Lorimer.150
Governor Rod Blagojevich’s claim that he wasn’t “giving it up
for [expletive] nothing,” in reference to then-President-elect
141
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Obama’s vacated Senate seat, provided a rare example of such
blatant corruption.151 Rather, most of the appointment scandals
occurring after 1913 have borne a stronger resemblance to the
type of indirect “rewards” for political favors that were the
hallmark of the political machine, exemplified in the case of
William Sheehan.152 For instance, in 1929, Pennsylvania
Governor John Fisher appointed Senator Joseph Grundy, a
textile manufacturer who was “an influential backer of
campaigns, [and] who had contributed heavily to Fisher’s
campaign.”153 In more recent years, gubernatorial appointments
have come to be seen as a choice to “reward patrons, install
relatives, [or to] put in placeholders . . . .”154
Unmerited appointments have become ever more
frequent, increasing the urgency to remove the appointment
power from the state executives. For example, in 2009, Florida
Governor Charlie Crist selected his “former chief of staff and
campaign ‘maestro’ George LeMieux,” marking the first time the
newly appointed senator would hold a public office.155 Critics of
the appointment, blasting it as an example of “cronyism,”
quickly responded with a bill that would require special
elections when a Senate seat is vacated.156 Appointments by
Louisiana’s Governor Edwin Edwards of his wife in 1972,157 and
Alaska’s Governor Frank Murkowski of his daughter in 2002,158
implicate cronyism’s closely related cousin—nepotism. Alaskan
151
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voters, like critics in Florida, responded swiftly with a ballot
initiative to require special elections when a vacancy arises in
the Senate.159 In Delaware, the appointment of Edward Kaufman
to fill Vice President-elect Joseph Biden’s Senate seat was
widely viewed as a mere “placeholder” for Beau Biden, until the
Vice President’s son returned from military service.160
Ultimately, both the son and the place-holding Senator declined
the opportunity to fill the father’s seat by the time the special
election did occur.161 Nevertheless, the treatment of a Senate seat
as “a family heirloom” gave ample ammunition for critics of
vacancy appointments to renew the call for special elections.162
Polling in the most recent states to incur a Senate
vacancy suggests immediate dissatisfaction and distrust among
the electorate after an appointment is made by the governor. In
New York, according to a poll conducted in September 2009, just
months after her appointment, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand
retained a 26% approval rating, while Governor Patterson’s
approval rating hovered around 17%.163 Newly appointed
Colorado Senator Michael Bennet, who was controversially
chosen to replace Senator Ken Salazar, enjoyed an approval
rating of just 31% according to an August 2009 poll,164 while the
governor who appointed him held a mere 40% approval rating.165
159

See supra text accompanying note 33.
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28, 2009; Bill Schneider, Senate Appointments Highlight Messy Process, CNN.COM (Feb. 5,
2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/02/05/schneider.senate.appoint/index.html.
Similarly, in Florida, Governor Charlie Crist’s appointment of George Lemieux was widely
seen as a placeholder for Crist himself to make a run at the Senate in 2010. See Michael
Muskal, Marco Rubio Defeats Gov. Charlie Crist in Florida Senate Race, L.A. TIMES, Nov.
2, 2010, http://articles.latimes.com/2010/nov/02/news/la-pn-crist-rubio-final.
161
GOP Encouraged to Pick Up Senate Seat as Beau Biden Decides Not to
Follow Dad, FOXNEWS.COM (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/01/
25/bidens-son-beau-announces-run-senate.
162
How Not to Pick a Senator: Three Examples Show Why Vacancies Should Be
Filled by Special Election, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2009, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/23/AR2009012303379.html.
163
Marist Poll: NYS Voters on White House Involvement in NYS Politics,
MARIST COLL. INST. FOR PUB. OP. (Sep. 24, 2009), http://maristpoll.marist.edu/wp-content/
misc/nyspolls/ny090922/Complete%20September%2024,%202009%20NYS%20Poll%20Rel
ease%20and%20Tables.pdf. Gillibrand would overcome the initial backlash surrounding
her appointment and win the special election held in 2010. See Appointee No More: NY’s
Gillibrand Wins Sen. Seat, WASH. POST.COM (Nov. 2, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/02/AR2010110206914.html. Governor Patterson, on
the other hand, never recovered politically and did not seek another term. See Hakim &
Peters, supra note 36.
164
Colorado Senate Pretty Wide Open, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING (Aug. 18, 2009),
http://publicpolicypolling.blogspot.com/2009/08/colorado-senate-pretty-wide-open.html.
165
Ritter Still Vulnerable, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING (Aug. 20, 2009), http://
www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/PPP_Release_CO_820925.pdf. Bennet used his time
160
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The immediate backlash against vacancy appointments in
Florida and Massachusetts was felt by Florida Governor Charlie
Crist, who saw a precipitous decline in his approval ratings from
60% to 48%,166 and Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick,
whose ratings following his appointment were among “the
lowest gubernatorial approval ratings in the country” in the
Democratic stronghold of Massachusetts.167 At a time when,
according to a December 2010 Gallup poll, Congress’s overall
approval rating stands at an all-time low of 13%, there exists a
dramatic need for trust and accountability in government.168
These goals can only be undermined when Senate vacancies are
filled by gubernatorial appointments.
The allegations of self-serving bribery, cronyism, and
nepotism surrounding the most recent Senate appointments
have reinvigorated the old debates waged in the run up to
passage of the Seventeenth Amendment. While introducing a
constitutional amendment to require special elections for vacant
Senate seats, Senator Russ Feingold drew a parallel between the
reformers’ fight for direct elections in the previous century, and
the current slate of appointment controversies, stating:
[The ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment] was the
culmination of a nearly century-long struggle. The public’s disgust
with the corruption, bribery, and political chicanery that resulted
from the original constitutional provision giving State legislatures

in Washington to “establish a solid financial base,” ultimately enabling him to edge out
Tea Party challenger Ken Buck in the 2010 special election. See Kevin Simpson, Allison
Sherry & Michael Booth, Bennet Wins in Senate Race, DENVERPOST.COM (Nov. 3, 2010),
http://www.denverpost.com/election2010/ci_16502977. Like his New York counterpart,
Colorado Governor Bill Ritter did not seek re-election in 2010. See Steven K. Paulson,
Hickenlooper Defeats Tancredo in Colorado Governor’s Race, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 2,
2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/11/02/hickenlooper-defeats-tanc_n_778004.html.
166
Dunkelberger, supra note 155. In 2010, Marco Rubio soundly defeated
Crist as the two battled to replace Lemieux in the Senate. See Muskal, supra note 160.
167
Eamon Javers, Obama Tries to Energize Patrick, POLITICO (Oct. 23, 2009),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1009/28661.html#. But see Tom Jensen, Our Governor
Approval Ratings, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING (Apr. 30, 2009), http://publicpolicypolling.
blogspot.com/2009/04/our-governor-approval-ratings.html (showing Delaware Governor
Jack Markell with a 62% job approval rating as recently in April, just months following
his appointment of Edward Kaufman). Governor Patrick ultimately survived to win reelection in 2010. See Abby Goodnough, Patrick Hangs on as Massachusetts Governor, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 3, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/03/us/politics/03mass.
html. However, his appointment was rebuked by the electorate as the Senate seat of Ted
Kennedy fell into Republican hands following Scott Brown’s surprise special election
victory. See Viser & Estes, supra note 21.
168
See Jeffrey M. Jones, Congress’ Job Approval Rating Worst in Gallup History,
GALLUP.COM (Dec. 15, 2010), http://www.gallup.com/poll/145238/congress-job-approvalrating-worst-gallup-history.aspx (“Americans currently hold Congress in lower esteem for
the job it is doing than at any point in the last 36 years.”).

1226

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:3

the power to choose United States Senators was a big motivation for
the amendment. As we have seen in recent months, gubernatorial
appointments may pose the same dangers. They demand the same
solution and, that is, direct elections.169

The perception that governors are ethically incapable of
choosing the people’s representatives mirrors one of the major
democratic defects that the framers of the Seventeenth
Amendment sought to remedy. In keeping with the spirit of the
amendment, the only solution to the recent wave of corrupt
appointments is to put democracy back into the hands of the
people when a vacancy in the Senate arises.
B.

Party Politics in Senate Appointments

As was the case prior to the passage of the Seventeenth
Amendment, party politics currently has an enormous influence
on the decision of who will represent the people in the Senate.
While the amendment’s vacancy provision has cured the
problem of legislative deadlocks by putting the appointment
power into the hands of the executive, other vexatious issues
that plagued the old electoral system continue to frustrate the
will of the people today. First, the modern day governor is just as
susceptible to political party power and influence as state
legislators were to the political machines prior to 1913. Further,
party influence over gubernatorial appointments and other state
and local issues blurs the lines between national and local
politics and engenders confusion among voters. Finally, the
political chicanery that corroded the legislative appointment
system continues to have a disproportionate impact on the
ultimate filling of a vacant Senate seat. The political party
apparatus wields more power now than ever before, and
gubernatorial Senate appointments have become a purely
political process under its direct purview and influence.
Professor Sanford Levinson raises the possibility that
the Seventeenth Amendment reformers may have believed that
removing the appointment power from the “party hacks” in the
state legislature and vesting it in the executive branch would
“diminish the relevance of political party identity” surrounding

169

A Constitutional Amendment Concerning Senate Vacancies: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2009)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Sen. Russ Feingold, Member, Sen. Comm. on the
Judiciary).

2011]

GUBERNATORIAL DISCRETION NOT ADVISED

1227

senatorial appointments.170 The notion that state executives
stand above the partisan fray cannot be given any sort of
credence today, as governors are just as reliant on their party’s
warchest of campaign capital and political organization as the
turn-of-the-century legislators were on their political machines.
For example, in the 2009 gubernatorial elections in New Jersey
and Virginia, both the Democratic and Republican parties
“pour[ed] unprecedented amounts of money and muscle” behind
their party candidates.171 In Virginia, the two parties
contributed over twenty million dollars in their attempts to
sway the outcome of the state’s election.172 In New Jersey, the
Republican National Committee spent another $4.1 million
backing Chris Christie for governor.173
Given this reliance on the national party apparatus, it
would be wishful to think that the governor, entrusted with a
decision that could sway the balance of power in both the
Senate and the country, would be insulated from the pressure
and influence of partisan politics. The statistics refute any such
idealistic notion. Of the fifty-seven Senate appointments made
by governors since 1960, only two have resulted in the
appointment of a senator from the governor’s opposing party.174
Hall Lusk, a Democrat from Oregon, was sent to Capitol Hill in
1960 by a Republican governor.175 The only other time a
governor has chosen a member of the opposing party was
Democratic Governor Dave Freudenthal’s appointment of
Republican John Barrasso, a choice forced on him by a
Wyoming law constraining the governor’s choice to a member of
the departed senator’s party.176 Governors are no less likely to
be influenced by their political party affiliation than were the
legislators of the early twentieth century. As Professor
Levinson points out, “[t]he fact that modern governors may not
170

Levinson, supra note 30, at 721.
David Chalian, National Parties Battle in VA and NJ to Set Stage for 2010,
ABC NEWS.COM (Oct. 7, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dnc-gop-battle-gubernatorialraces-virginia-jersey-setting/story?id=8768117.
172
Id.
173
Michael O’Brien, RNC Spends over $13 Million on Va., N.J. Gov. Races, THE
HILL (Oct. 29, 2008), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/65365-rnc-spendsover-13-million-on-va-nj-gov-races.
174
See Ken Rudin, The Ever-Shrinking Democratic Field for ‘08, NPR.ORG (Dec.
20, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=6653800 (citing only one
instance where a senator was appointed by a governor from the opposing party, having
been written prior to Senator Barrasso’s appointment in 2007).
175
Id.
176
Amar, supra note 11, at 727.
171
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be ‘bosses’ does not lessen their identity one whit, by and large,
as thoroughly political and partisan creatures.”177
Furthermore, national party entrenchment in state and
local affairs can blur the lines between national and local politics
and engender confusion among voters when they elect their
state officers. As evidenced by spending levels in gubernatorial
elections, the national political parties and other out-of-state
political action committees pump enormous amounts of money
into influencing voters’ decisions regarding in-state affairs.178
Aside from investments of capital, political parties now practice
a modern form of “canvassing,” where national political stars
invade small towns to pledge their support behind the local
candidates. For instance, during the 2009 election season,
President Obama and Vice President Biden appeared in New
Jersey to stump for incumbent governor Jon Corzine,179 while
big-name Republicans Sarah Palin and Newt Gingrich
interjected themselves into an obscure upstate New York
congressional race, hoping to change their party’s national
profile.180 Attack ads produced and paid for by the political
parties tying the state candidate to the unpopular policies of
national political figures are a common sight each fall, as are ads
attempting to exploit the popularity of a national figure in the
candidate’s same party. As a result, modern state elections are
often viewed as a referendum on national party policies rather
than a vote on pressing local issues.181
This convergence of state and national party politics
makes a governor’s appointment decision inherently political,
as an unpopular appointment could become a determinative
issue in the next gubernatorial campaign. In 2008, Alaska
voters ousted incumbent Governor Frank Murkowski in favor
of Sarah Palin, due in part to the former’s nepotistic

177

Levinson, supra note 30, at 722.
See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text; see also Olympia Meola,
Out-of-State Groups Pump $6 Million into Va. Gubernatorial Race, RICHMOND TIMESDISPATCH, July 19, 2009, http://www2.timesdispatch.com/news/2009/jul/19/cash19_
20090718-222406-ar-36842.
179
Paul Steinhauser, Clinton Stumps for Corzine, CNN POLITICS (Oct. 20,
2009), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/10/20/clinton-stumps-for-corzine.
180
See Janet Hook, New York Race at Epicenter of GOP a Mutiny, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 27, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/27/nation/na-gop-identity-crisis27.
181
See Dana Milbank, Referendum on Obama? Depends on Who Wins, WASH.
POST, Nov. 3, 2009, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/02/
AR2009110202873.html.
178
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appointment of his daughter to the Senate.182 Governor
Patterson’s appointment of Kirsten Gillebrand, on the other
hand, was portrayed by the New York Times as “a careful
political calculation by the governor, who will run for his
second term as governor in 2010 . . . .”183 The controversies
surrounding Senate appointments have the potential to
overwhelm critical local issues that are at stake during a
gubernatorial campaign and can lead to misrepresentation in
state government. The blending of national politics in the state
process was one of the primary reasons for the constitutional
change to direct elections.184
Finally, the political stunts and tricks that reformers
sought to eliminate with passage of the Seventeenth
Amendment remain a plague on the vacancy system. Though
the power to fill a vacant Senate seat by appointment is the
exclusive domain of the governor, it is the state legislatures
that make the initial determination of whether the seat will be
filled by a special election or a gubernatorial appointment.185
Therefore, the process of naming a successor remains
vulnerable to the same influences and political tricks that were
prevalent before the implementation of direct elections. This
was acutely demonstrated in Massachusetts, where state
Democrats in control of the legislature stripped Republican
Governor Mitt Romney of his appointment powers in 2004,186
only to reinstitute gubernatorial appointments in 2009 with a
Democratic governor in charge and a sixty-seat Senate
supermajority hanging in the balance.187 This brand of political
manipulation, similar to the practice of “gerrymandering,”
where state and congressional district lines are redrawn by the
party in power, is designed to perpetuate party control and
undermine the will of the people.188 Thus, the party in control of

182

Alaska Gov. Murkowski Concedes Defeat in GOP Gubernatorial Primary,
FOXNEWS.COM (Aug. 23, 2006), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,209918,00.html
(“His approval ratings have skidded over the past four years because of much-criticized
decisions such as appointing his daughter to his U.S. Senate seat . . . .”).
183
Hernandez, Hakim & Confessore, supra note 36.
184
See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
185
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“[T]he executive authority of such State shall
issue writs of election . . . [p]rovided, That the legislature of any State may empower
the executive thereof to make temporary appointments . . . .”).
186
See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
187
See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
188
See Amar, supra note 11, at 746. Amar argues that gerrymandered districts
caused misrepresentation in state legislative halls and led to the appointment of senators
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the state legislature can still exercise direct and undue
influence over the choice of the new senator.189
In 2007, Hawaii recognized these dangers and changed
its laws to require the governor to select the new senator from
“the same political party as the prior incumbent.”190 The goal in
Hawaii was to create an appointment process “free of political
gamesmanship or controversy” and “ensure the integrity of the
legislative process.”191 Only Arizona, Utah, and Wyoming192 have
followed Hawaii’s lead in an attempt to reduce the “potential
for partisan shenanigans.”193 It is doubtful this potential can
ever be completely eradicated so long as the modern-day
political machines continue to exercise enormous influence and
control over state politics and the replacement of senators.
C.

Special Interest Influence on the Political Process

Contrary to the aspirations of the Seventeenth
Amendment reformers, special interests are more active today
than ever before in Washington, D.C., and throughout the
country on the state and local levels. Though campaigns are often
filled with promises to “change the culture in politics,” a coded
phrase for eliminating special interest influence over
legislation,194 Washington remains “a city dominated by influence-

who would have otherwise been defeated in state-wide popular elections. Id. Thus,
gerrymandering was a “largely unnoticed” cause of the change to direct elections. Id.
189
See id. at 754 (“[A] legislature could still decide . . . depending on the party
identity of the governor and the current U.S. Senators, to enact or repeal such a law
requiring party continuity.”).
190
HAW. REV. STAT. § 17-1 (2009).
191
Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 57, § 1 (2007).
192
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-222(C) (2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-1-502(b)
(LexisNexis 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-18-111(a)(i) (2009).
193
Amar, supra note 11, at 754. Still, these statutes do not go far enough,
since they fail to recognize the will of the independent voter who votes for a person and
not a party. See infra text accompanying notes 242-44.
194
For instance, throughout the course of the 2008 presidential debates, both
Senator McCain and President Obama made numerous mentions of their records on
fighting the special interests. President Obama told the country that “we’re going to
have to change the culture in Washington so that lobbyists and special interests aren’t
driving the process . . . . The key is whether . . . we’ve got priorities that are working for
you as opposed to those who have been dictating the policy in Washington lately, and
that’s mostly lobbyists and special interests.” Transcript of Second McCain, Obama
Debate, http://www.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/07/presidential.debate.transcript (last
visited Feb. 1, 2011). Senator McCain, during the course of the debates, stated, “I think
if we get rid of cronyism and special interest influence in Washington . . . we can act
more effectively.” Id. McCain also touted his record on the issue, telling the country
that he had “advocated and taken on the special interests.” Id.
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seeking money and special-interest lobbyists.”195 In fact, as
Professor Zywicki argues, the advent of direct elections has made
special interest lobbying prohibitively easier by allowing
corporations to lobby Congress directly, rather than going
through the middle-man—the state legislature.196 This theory is
borne out in the level of influence that big business exerts over
seemingly every major policy issue on all levels of government
today. Still, this unintended benefit bestowed on special interest
groups does not counsel leaving the authority to choose a senator
in the hands of one person, who in many instances has herself
been the recipient of corporate and special interest funds. Rather,
in keeping with the spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment, the
decision should remain in the hands of the people.
In the years immediately following passage of the
Seventeenth Amendment, numerous elections were challenged
on grounds that the victor had used excessive campaign funds,
often provided by special interest lobbyists. For instance, the
1926 senatorial election of Thomas Schall in Minnesota, viewed
as a conflict “between agrarian and industrial interests,” was
contested on such grounds.197 In 1928, Governor Lennington
Small of Illinois was forced to make an appointment following
the Senate’s refusal to seat Colonel Frank L. Smith, the winner
of the election who stood accused of accepting excessive
contributions from public utility companies.198 Though Smith was
ousted due to special interest meddling that had tainted his
campaign, Governor Small’s subsequent appointment to fill the
vacant seat was characterized as the product of heavy pressure
exerted by “large business and agricultural interests.”199
Supreme Court decisions in the past one hundred years
have allowed special interest influence to fester and expand
throughout the country. In Newberry v. United States,
195

Albert R. Hunt, Some Holdouts to Obama’s Vow to Change Washington,
BLOOMBERG.COM (Oct. 26, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601070
&sid=aFAPkVN34Kpw (quoting Fred Wertheimer, an advocate for campaign finance reform).
196
Zywicki, supra note 99, at 216; see also HOEBEKE, supra note 8, at 106 (“In
short, the historical trend toward greater popularization of Senate elections, by
transferring direct responsibility from the legislators to the electorate en masse, had given
rise to the very conditions which reformers hoped to end with even more popularization.”).
197
The Election Case of Magnus Johnson v. Thomas D. Schall of Minnesota (1926),
U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/contested_elections/
106Johnson_Schall.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
198
The Election Case of Frank L. Smith of Illinois (1928), U.S. SENATE, http://
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/contested_elections/110Frank_Smith.htm
(last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
199
Gov. Small Asked to Name Senator, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1928.
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automobile magnate Henry Ford challenged the 1918 election of
Senator Truman Newberry on grounds that his excessive
campaign expenditures violated federal law.200 The Court struck
down the statute, which attempted to regulate campaign
financing in primary elections.201 Since that decision, the Court
has undercut similar attempts to regulate the influx of special
interest capital into the electoral process. In Buckley v. Valeo,
the Court struck down portions of the Federal Election
Campaign Act that attempted to place a ceiling on campaign
expenditures by individuals and groups, as an infringement of
First Amendment political expression.202 Though the Court has
upheld caps on campaign contributions,203 its attempt to balance
the “problem of large campaign contributions . . . where the
actuality and potential for corruption have been identified” while
simultaneously allowing for “free . . . independent political
expression”204 has left an open window for special interest groups
to influence public policy. This window was blown open in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, where the
Supreme Court struck down a portion of the McCain-Feingold
Act that prohibited corporations and unions from making
independent expenditures to advocate for the election or defeat
of a particular candidate.205 The landmark decision was
immediately criticized by President Obama as “a major victory
for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and
the other powerful interests that marshal their power every day
in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.”206
200

Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 245 (1921).
Id. at 258.
202
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976) (holding that the prevention of the
“appearance of corruption” was not a sufficient justification for expenditure limits); see
also Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 617-18 (1996)
(where a plurality held that the Republican party’s expenditure on radio attack ads
was an independent expenditure and thus not subject to federal contribution limits).
The absence of coordination between the party and its candidate regarding the
advertising campaign rendered the expenditure “independent” and took it out of the
realm of a regulated “contribution.” Id. at 614. The expenditure was therefore
guaranteed First Amendment protection. Id.
203
See Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392-93 (2000)
(distinguishing limits on expenditures from contribution caps on the grounds that
“‘limitations on independent expenditures are less directly related to preventing
corruption’ than contributions are”) (quoting Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm.,
518 U.S. at 615).
204
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 28.
205
130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (“Government may not suppress political speech on the
basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.”).
206
Adam Liptak, Justices, 5-4, Reject Corporate Spending Limit, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 21, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/22/us/politics/22scotus.html.
201
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The presidential criticism of the Supreme Court
represented the growing distrust on the part of an American
public that has witnessed the disproportionate influence that
special interest groups have exerted over its representatives in
recent years. For example, in 2009, the website Politico reported
that companies and financial institutions that had received
TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program) funds from the federal
government were using portions of the taxpayers’ money to
lobby the same politicians who had given them the money in the
first instance.207 In defense of this practice, a spokesperson for
General Motors said, “[W]e have an obligation to remain
engaged at the federal and state levels and to have our voice
heard in the policymaking process.”208 Just as potential changes
in the regulation of the financial system attracted the attention
and money of special interests, so too did the debates
surrounding reform of the nation’s health care system. The war
over health care legislation, which played out publicly as a
debate between Democrats and Republicans, was being waged
behind the scenes by pharmaceutical companies and labor
unions against health insurance companies and business
groups.209 The White House reportedly sided with the former,
reaching a deal with the pharmaceutical companies whereby it
would veto any act of Congress that would extract any more
than the $80 billion in cost reductions over ten years already
promised by the pharmaceutical industry.210 In exchange, the
Democrats would receive industry support and $150 million in
advertising contributions to support the health care initiative.211
Despite yearly campaign promises, the quid-pro-quo business of
Washington politics has not changed. Echoing the words of
Abraham Lincoln, Representative Dennis Kucinich of Ohio
bemoaned special interest control over the health care debate
and other policy issues in the nation’s capital, stating:
Is this the best we can do . . . guaranteeing at least $50 billion in
new business for the insurance companies . . . but the government
won’t negotiate with the pharmaceutical companies which will drive
207

Jeanne Cummings, From Under TARP, Banks Add Lobbying, POLITICO
(July 28, 2009), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/25497.html.
208
Id.
209
Associated Press, ‘Special Interests’ on Both Sides in Health Fight,
MSNBC.COM (Aug. 19, 2009), http://rss.msnbc.msn.com/id/32479506/ns/politics-health_
care_reform.
210
David D. Kirkpatrick, White House Affirms Deal on Drug Cost, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/06/health/policy/06insure.html.
211
Associated Press, supra note 209.
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up pharmaceutical costs. Is this the best we can do . . . [Then] we
have to ask some hard questions about our political system . . .
Government of the people, or government by the corporations?212

While special interest influence has expanded in the
federal arena since passage of the Seventeenth Amendment,213
it remains endemic on the state and local level as well. For
instance, in the 2009 New Jersey gubernatorial race,
challenger Chris Christie took in $401,700 from business
groups, with nearly $60,000 coming from medical device
companies.214 His opponent, incumbent governor Jon Corzine,
received money from a variety of interests, including business
groups, law firms, and state employees.215 In Florida, Governor
Charlie Crist, who had appointed George LeMieux to fill a
vacant Senate seat,216 took in a record $4 million in the first
fifty days after announcing his own bid to run for the Senate.217
Although federal and state laws limit contributions to a
candidate, lobbyists and politicians like Crist have been able to
circumvent the laws by using a practice known as “bundling.”218
It was LeMieux who defended the practice of bundling
contributions in 2008 before he was appointed senator, even
where it would “sweep[] in donations from troubled businesses
or the money of out-of-staters with no apparent interest in the
election.”219 And in Massachusetts, Governor Deval Patrick
stood accused of using a conduit known as the “Seventy-First”
fund to evade state campaign contribution laws.220 The scandal
212

111 Cong. Rec. H3962 (Oct. 29, 2009) (statement of Rep. Dennis Kucinich),
available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dzzVppah_mg.
213
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
214
Ted Sherman, N.J. Gubernatorial Candidates Gov. Corzine, Christie Get
Campaign Funds from Special Interests, STAR LEDGER, Oct. 11, 2009, http://www.nj.
com/news/index.ssf/2009/10/nj_gubernatorial_candidates_go_1.html.
215
Id.
216
See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
217
Beth Reinhard, Governor Charlie Crist’s Senate Campaign Reaps Benefits
from Bundling of Donations, MIAMIHERALD.COM (July 22, 2009), http://www.tampa
bay.com/news/politics/gubernatorial/article1020488.ece.
218
Id. “Bundling” allows lobbyists constrained by state law caps on
contributions to exceed the threshold by pooling together contributions from different
sources. Id. For instance, in Florida, state law caps a lobbyist’s contributions to a
political campaign at $2400. However, a Jacksonville lobbyist was able to contribute
$139,250 to Governor Crist by pooling contributions from his corporate clients. Id.
219
Jennifer Liberto & Rob Farley, Donations for McCain and Crist Bundled
Far from Florida, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Aug. 21, 2008, http://www.tampabay.com/
news/politics/state/article778639.ece.
220
See Frank Phillips, Patrick Fund-Raising Arrangement Skirts Law: Donations
Channeled Through Democratic Party, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 23, 2008, http://www.boston.com/
news/local/articles/2008/01/23/patrick_fund_raising_arrangement_skirts_law. This ethically
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forced the governor’s own party to pass a new state ethics law
to close loopholes that had allowed him to circumvent the
contribution caps,221 just three months before his senatorial
appointment at the height of the national health care debate.222
Despite modest attempts at limiting the ability of special
interest groups to influence public policy, there is still ample
opportunity for massive corporate donations on both the federal
and state levels. Prior to passage of the Seventeenth
Amendment, it was the state legislators who were accused of
being under the influence of special interest lobbyists.223 Today,
all politicians, including governors, have proven to be equally
incapable of resisting the expansive war chests of big business.
Thus, there is legitimate concern that lobbyists can exercise
undue influence over a governor’s senatorial appointment. This
is added reason, in keeping with the intent of the framers of the
Seventeenth Amendment, to transfer the power of replacing a
vacant Senate seat back into the hands of the people.
IV.

THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM

The Supreme Court, by affirming a particularly
egregious use of the gubernatorial appointment power in
Valenti v. Rockefeller, has upheld its validity against
constitutional challenge.224 In Valenti, voters brought an action
against Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York, challenging
his authority to appoint a successor for Senator Robert F.
Kennedy following the assassination of the Senator.225 New
York’s election law required that a vacancy be filled by a
special election to occur at the annual November elections, so
long as sixty days had passed between the vacancy and the
primary election.226 However, since Robert Kennedy died on
June 6, 1968, and New York held its primary elections within
the same month, a replacement could not be named until the
questionable practice allowed the governor to accept up to $5500 in political contributions,
well in excess of a state law that provided for a $500 contribution ceiling. Id.
221
See Matt Viser, Leaders Approve Ethics Revamp: House, Senate to Vote
Today; Bill Would Bar Most Gifts, BOS. GLOBE, June 25, 2009, http://www.boston.com/
news/local/massachusetts/articles/2009/06/25/legislative_leaders_approve_bill_to_overh
aul_ethics_laws/?page=2.
222
See supra text accompanying note 16.
223
See supra Part II.B.3.
224
393 U.S. 405 (1969).
225
Valenti v. Rockefeller, 292 F. Supp. 851, 853 (W.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d, 393
U.S. 405 (1969).
226
Id. at 854.
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elections of November 1969.227 To add insult to the voters’
injury, New York election law required that special elections
for Senate seats take place in even-numbered years.228
Therefore, voters would have to wait until November 1970, a
full twenty-nine months after the vacancy was created, to
democratically elect their representative in the Senate.229
Construing the two-year appointment of a senator as merely
“temporary,” and therefore compliant with the Seventeenth
Amendment, the district court held the delay was justified by
the legitimate government interests in maximizing voter
turnout,230 allowing the parties and candidates proper time to
finance a campaign,231 and retaining a primary election
system.232 In reaching its conclusions, the court found there to
be “no fundamental imperfection in the functioning of
democracy.”233 The dissent found these justifications to be
“exaggerated” and “too remote and unsubstantial to warrant
the resulting denial of the popular will.”234 To the dissent, the
Seventeenth Amendment’s unmistakable command for popular
sovereignty rendered the twenty-nine month period that voters
would have to wait to choose their senator a betrayal of “the
revered principle of government ‘by the people.’”235
The justifying interests identified in Valenti and
accepted by the Supreme Court become even less compelling in
the current political environment. Voter turnout is far easier to
promote today with advancements in communication
technology and grassroots “get out the vote” campaigns, not to
mention the twenty-four hour cable news cycle which covers
elections like horse races and brings heightened awareness to
key issues throughout the country.236 Nor is the expense of
financing a campaign a compelling justification for depriving
the people of their right to vote. The reach of the national party
227

Id. at 855.
Id. at 854.
229
Id. at 855.
230
Id. at 859.
231
Id. at 859-60.
232
Id. at 861.
233
Id. at 867.
234
Id. at 888 (Frankel, J., dissenting).
235
Id. at 875-76 (majority opinion).
236
See Liz Sidoti, Races an Early Test of Obama Influence, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
3, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2010192606_apuselectionrdp4t
hldwritethru.html (President Obama has “deployed the Democratic National Committee
and his own political campaign arm, Organizing for America, to ensure the swarms of
new voters he attracted in 2008 turn out even if he’s not on the ballot.”).
228
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apparatus, political action committees, and the internet have
helped place viable candidates before the public in rapid
turnaround time.237 Furthermore, the interest in retaining
special election primaries stands in contradiction to the goal of
controlling expense to the candidates and the parties.238 If mere
expense is sufficient reason to forestall the right to vote, then
conducting a special election without a primary would reduce
this burden and still provide for popular sovereignty. Promptly
filling vacancies and saving taxpayer money have also been
identified by other courts as legitimate government interests
that are sufficient to remove the right to vote from the people.239
Yet time spent giving the people the right to choose their
leaders has not been an impediment to the House of
Representatives, where special elections are required when a
vacancy arises.240 Taxpayer expense should also not be sufficient
reason to burden the right to vote and deprive those same
taxpayers of a basic democratic tenet.241
237

For instance, in a special election to replace a vacant House seat in New
York’s twenty-third district, conservative political groups and the Republican National
committee pumped large amounts of money in just a matter of weeks behind out-ofstate conservative Doug Hoffman, propelling him from an obscure, out-of-state third
party candidate to the top of the polls. See Justin Blum, Republican Scozzafava Backs
Democrat in New York Congress Race, BLOOMBERG.COM (Nov. 2, 2009) http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=afQoujAldk.U; see also Rachel Weiner,
Palin Endorses Hoffman, Snubs GOP Candidate in New York House Race, HUFFINGTON
POST (Oct. 23, 2009), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/10/23/palin-endorses-hoffmansn_n_331279.html.
238
See Trinsey v. Pennsylvania, 941 F.2d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 1991) (“The
legislature is free to decide that it is not in the interests of the state to require that a
special primary, with its attendant expense for the state and the candidates, be held
before the special election when . . . the vacancy occurs too late to be filled in the usual
spring primary.”). The interest in promptly filling a vacant Senate seat is also
undermined by the Valenti interest in retaining party primaries. Id.
239
See Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 12 (1982)
(upholding temporary appointments to the legislature in the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico); see also Amar, supra note 11, at 751-52.
240
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (“When vacancies happen in the Representation
from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such
Vacancies.”); see also Paul Taylor, Proposals to Prevent Discontinuity in Government and
Preserve the Right to Elected Representation, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 435, 438 (2004)
(“Indeed, the House of Representatives is constitutionally unique in that it is the only
part of the federal government whose legitimacy is based exclusively on democratic
elections.”); Hearing, supra note 169, at 2 (statement of Rep. Russ Feingold) (“No one can
represent the people in the House of Representatives without the approval of the voters.
The same should be true for the Senate.”).
241
See Statement of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold on Introduction of a
Constitutional Amendment Concerning Senate Vacancies, U.S. SENATE (Jan. 29, 2009),
http://feingold.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=307525 [hereinafter Feingold Statement] (“But
the cost to our democracy of continuing the anachronism of gubernatorial Senate
appointments is far greater than the cost of infrequent special elections . . . . I find the
cost argument wholly unconvincing.”).
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Four states have attempted to strike a balance between
the state’s interests and the people’s right to vote by allowing
gubernatorial appointments, but constraining the choice to a
member of the departed senator’s political party.242 These
statutes make the questionable assumption that retaining
party continuity is an accurate reflection of the will of the
people. However, they do not take into account the possibility
that the vacant Senate seat may have been created due to a
scandal implicating the political party as a whole.243 Further,
they ignore the will of the independent voter who votes for a
person rather than for a party.244 In short, these statutes are
quick-fix solutions that miss the major issue with
gubernatorial appointments: they deprive people of the right to
choose, an essential component of popular sovereignty. Perhaps
nothing illustrates the importance of the right to choose better
than the “American Rule,” applied by a majority of courts,
which upholds votes for a deceased candidate on grounds that
it reflects the people’s choice to disavow another candidate in
favor of creating a vacancy.245 Whether a voter’s motivation is to
send a preferred candidate to Washington, or simply to choose
to prevent a less desired candidate from getting there, the
element of choice has been fundamental to our form of
government since passage of the Seventeenth Amendment.
As the “[j]udge of the Elections, Returns, and
Qualifications of its own Members,”246 the onus to reform a broken
system falls exclusively to Congress. Senator Russ Feingold,
leading the charge for a constitutional amendment, invoked the
struggle of the Seventeenth Amendment reformers, stating, “it
seems obvious to us that the Senate should be elected by the
people, [but] the struggle for that right was not easy or fast. But
the cause was just and in the end the call for direct elections was
too strong to be ignored.”247 If the cause was just in the early
242

See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
See Amar, supra note 11, at 756.
244
A July 2009 poll from the Washington Post and ABC News identified
independent voters as 41% of the overall electorate. John Avlon, Commentary: Obama
Losing Independent Voters, CNN.COM (Aug. 27, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/
POLITICS/08/27/avlon.obama.independents/index.html.
245
See Michael G. Adams, Missouri Compromise: Did the Posthumous
Senatorial Election of Mel Carnahan and Subsequent Appointment of Jean Carnahan
Compromise Federal or State Law?, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 433, 439 (2002). The American
rule allows votes for a deceased candidate to count, and was invoked in Mel Carnahan’s
posthumous victory over John Ashcroft for a Missouri Senate seat. Id. at 435.
246
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
247
Feingold Statement, supra note 241.
243
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twentieth century, then it is certainly a just cause today.
Corruption, or at least strong appearances of impropriety in
gubernatorial appointments, remain prevalent and undermine
faith and trust in the government.248 Political chicanery and
gamesmanship continue to disproportionately influence who will
represent the people in the Senate.249 Special interests, often
chided as the enemy of democracy, are stronger and more
powerful now than they ever were prior to direct elections.250
At a time when the country is so sharply and evenly
divided over a range of critical issues, the notion of unelected
senators deciding matters of national importance violates the
spirit of the Seventeenth Amendment and offends our democratic
principles. The time has come for Congress to put an end to
gubernatorial Senate appointments and ensure once again a
government of the people, by the people, and for the people.
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